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| **Document Title:** | **Does the "Race of Places" Influence Police Officer Decision Making?** |
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Similarly, a score of "4" primarily represents unchanged calls from Code 1 to Code 2 that resulted in a report, but other reports could be reflected in scores between 0 and 8.

**Table 8. Total scores and their distribution across entire decision pathway**

| Score | Frequency | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | 1452 | .5 |
| -3 | 5880 | 2.2 |
| -2 | 3215 | 1.2 |
| -1 | 31103 | 11.6 |
| 0 | 141925 | 53.0 |
| 1 | 4741 | 1.8 |
| 2 | 2665 | 1.0 |
| 3 | 1863 | .7 |
| 4 | 57060 | 21.3 |
| 5 | 670 | .3 |
| 6 | 2182 | .8 |
| 7 | 2485 | .9 |
| 8 | 8796 | 3.3 |
| 9 | 1384 | .5 |
| 10 | 478 | .2 |
| 11 | 2028 | .8 |
| 12 | 10 | .0 |
| Total | 267937 | 100.0 |

The vast majority of these are incidents that ended at the call for service and no further action or change in crime classification was taken.

THE PLACES THAT DECISION PATHWAYS OCCUR

To examine the relationship of characteristics of geographic areas and the decision pathways within these areas, one option is to assign each individual pathway the characteristics of the area in which it occurs. However, this presents the problem of assigning information from a large geographic unit (i.e., a Census track) to a smaller location within that unit (i.e., an address), creating a possible ecological fallacy and violations of statistical independence, given that all individual incidents are assigned the same values within an area. Hierarchical models are useful when both individual and place-based covariates exist, where individual incidents are nested inside of larger areas. However, in this study, neither individual co-variates are available, nor can characteristics of places be specified at the level of an incident's address. Yet, using large areas like neighborhoods, tracts, or even police beats to compare general rates of crime or upgrading and downgrading, may not be useful either, a process which has limited prior studies (e.g., Smith (1986) use discrete neighborhoods, Petrocelli et al. (2003) used Census tracts, and Liska and Chamlin (1984) use cities). There may be high levels of spatial heterogeneity across these larger geographic units in not only attributes of race, ethnicity, or economic characteristics of place, but also officer decision making. This heterogeneity may be masked with aggregation (Weisburd et al., 2009) or lost if only a few of these places are studied (Hipp, 2007; Oberwittler & Wikström, 2009). Oberwittler and Wikström (2009) for instance, argue that individuals tend to assess and be impacted by areas immediately surrounding their residence, and that using smaller areas as geographic units of analysis is more advantageous because more homogenous observations within those areas can be found (Oberwittler & Wikström call this "homogenous heterogeneity," p. 57).

A compromise for this study involved three actions: decreasing the size of the geographic unit within which analysis is done; comparing the entire field of these units within a jurisdiction; and averaging total and specific decision pathway scores at these small places to gain the tendencies of upgrading and downgrading at these places. At a practical level, comparing decision making in much more smaller geographic units of analysis reinforces the reality that police decision making occurs at much more smaller and specific places, even smaller than an officer's police beat. However, there is a tradeoff. As geographic units become smaller, information at those places becomes less available due to privacy concerns. The smallest geographic area in which both socioeconomic and demographic information can be obtained for this study is the Census block-group, of which there are 568 in this jurisdiction averaging 0.15 square miles. The block-group can be conceptualized at the smaller geographic side of

Brantingham and Brantingham's (1981) *meso* level of geography and is on average, about one-sixth the size of patrol beats in this city. Although information about race is available at an even smaller level of Census geography—the block-level—other socioeconomic characteristics of interest are not.

Thus, for this analysis, the block group is used as the geographic unit of analysis, and the decision pathway *tendency* within that block group, as quantified by averages of upgrading and downgrading scores are calculated for each of the 568 block groups. To do this, the location of the start of the decision pathway is geographically referenced in ArcGIS[8] so that each incident can be assigned to the specific Census block group through a process of spatial joining. This allows for scores from decision pathways (specific scores at each decision point and the total scores) to be averaged across each block group, and for those averages to be analyzed with characteristics of that block group.

Table 9 shows descriptive statistics of the average pathway scores for each decision within the pathway for the 568 block groups in Seattle. Each of the 568 block groups contain, on average, approximately 471 decision pathways (standard deviation 823.80). The mean in the row labeled "average score change from initial call to modification" reflects the mean of the averages of the scores of the first decision point in the pathway across block groups. Thus, -0.18 indicates that, on average, block groups had pathways experienced a slight downgrading of .18 points (s.d. = .069 points) when an officer initially responded and modified the call. Similarly, the average upgrade from the modified call for service to the report writing stage indicates that when averaging across block groups, the average scores of the decision to make a report within those pathways was 1.23. This is less than 4, since the vast majority of incidents did not result in a report.

[8] *www.esri.com/software/arcgis*

**Table 9. Mean Decision and Pathway Scores Across Block Groups**

| | N | Min. | Max. | Mean | S.D. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average score change from initial call to modification | 568 | -.50 | .12 | -.184 | .069 |
| Average score change modification to report and report type | 568 | .50 | 2.29 | 1.23 | .244 |
| Average score change from report to arrest and arrest type | 568 | .00 | .93 | .15 | .110 |
| Average score of the total decision pathway score for each block group | 568 | .31 | 2.5 | 1.19 | .308 |

The next step in this analysis was to use multivariate regression to determine what might predict these upgrading and downgrading tendencies in block groups. However, including these averages of upgrading and downgrading in multivariate regression may lead to misspecification of the regression model due to spatial dependence in the data. Decision-making tendencies by officers in one block group may be dependent on tendencies in adjacent block groups, leading to the existence of spatial dependence (see Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005; Ward and Gleditsch, 2008). The possibility of this occurring with police behavior within neighboring places is high; often the same officers are responding to adjacent places, and spatial dependence if often found to exist among many socioeconomic variables, including crime. Using a spatially lagged dependent variable regression model, therefore, is appropriate in order to achieve more accurate model estimates. Indeed, for this study, conducting regression using spatially lagged dependent variables always improved the fit of each regression model. So, to create spatially lagged average decision score for each block group across the decision pathway and for the entire pathway, the software GeoDa[9] was employed (see Anselin, 2003; Anselin et al., 2006). All of the regression models below use the spatially lagged average pathway scores for each block group.

## FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION PATHWAYS

For the co-variates of the regression models, the literature review suggested that a number of place-based factors that might influence decision making pathways. The level of violent crime as well as calls for service were recorded for each block group from the data itself, as Smith (1986) indicated this may lead to a systematic downgrading of events. These were found to be highly correlated (see Appendix A), and in most models, only the violence measure was used. From the 2000 U.S. Census, the percentage of Black, White, Asian, Hispanic, and foreign-born residents, as well as the proportion of households that were linguistically isolated were collected. Census also provides information on socioeconomic characteristics of block groups, which can also condition officer behavior, as others have discovered (e.g., Terrill & Reisig, 2003). There are many census measures which can be used to describe these characteristics and which also have been used by scholars to indicate social disorganization, community needs, concentrated poverty, or levels of community wealth at places (see Anderson, 1990; Gottfredson et al., 1991; Gottfredson & Taylor, 1986; Park et al., 1925; Shaw et al.1929; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Wooldredge, 2002).

As these socioeconomic indicators are highly correlated, I use principle component analysis (see Table 10) to reduce these variables into three factors: “DISORG,” “NEEDS,” and “WEALTH”. The DISORG component groups several factors associated with social disorganization, including high loads of measures of poverty, renter-occupied homes and population density. The NEEDS measure included percentage of households that headed by

[9] For more information on GeoDa, go to https://www.geoda.uiuc.edu/.

females with children, the percentage of unemployed individuals over the age of 16, and those receiving public assistance. Finally, the WEALTH component includes high loads of median housing values, income, and college education.

**Table 10. Rotated Component Matrix for Socioeconomic Variables**

| | DISORG | NEEDS | WEALTH |
|---|---|---|---|
| % renting | .834 | | |
| Population density (people per square mile) | .802 | | |
| % under poverty level | .682 | .524 | |
| % receiving public assistance | | .838 | |
| Female-headed house w/children | | .791 | |
| % over age 16 and unemployed | | .459 | |
| Median housing value for owner-occupied units | | | .908 |
| Median household income in 1999 | -.577 | | .720 |
| % over 25 with 4-year college degree | | -.536 | .686 |

The KMO=.758 indicating an adequate sample size. The total variance explained by the model was 72.6%. Varimax rotated principal component matrix in five iterations.

The descriptive statistics for all of the explanatory variables used, the three factors, and other measures of interest (including statistics on the average number of persons, property, drugs and vice, suspicions, and disorder calls for service across block groups) are included in Table 11. The correlation matrix for these variables is in Appendix A. Multivariate regression models were then ran to examine the relationship between upgrading and downgrading tendencies within block groups and place characteristics.

**Table 11. Descriptive statistics for 568 block groups in Seattle**

| | Mean | S.D. | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total calls for service | 471.55 | 823.801 | 44.00 | 11,738.00 |
| Calls for service per 100 people[a] | 48.88 | 82.710 | 5.25 | 990.44 |
| Proportion of calls indicating violence | .05 | .025 | .00 | .16 |
| Land area in square miles | .15 | .172 | .02 | 2.48 |
| % Black | .08 | .119 | .00 | .6519 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| % White | .72 | .241 | .00 | 1.0000 |
| % Asian | .12 | .140 | .00 | .7317 |
| % Hispanic | .05 | .055 | .00 | .4442 |
| % Foreign-born | .16 | .123 | .00 | .62 |
| % Linguistically isolated | .05 | .077 | .00 | .61 |
| DISORG factor[b] | .00 | 1.000 | -1.44 | 6.98 |
| % renting | .4521 | .268 | .00 | 1.00 |
| Population Density | 10,104.45 | 8,486.996 | 208.48 | 97,444.95 |
| % Under poverty level | .11 | .108 | .00 | .63 |
| NEEDS factor[b] | .00 | 1.000 | -1.69 | 6.84 |
| % receiving public assistance | .03 | .045 | .00 | .37 |
| Female-headed household w/children | .05 | .053 | .00 | .42 |
| % over age 16 and unemployed | .0516 | .06445 | .00 | 1.00 |
| WEALTH factor[b] | .00 | 1.000 | -2.33 | 5.80 |
| Median housing value | 269,318 | 135,455 | 0 | 1,000,001 |
| Median household income in 1999 | 52,753 | 22,173 | 0 | 200,001 |
| % over 25 w/ 4-year college degree | .48 | .191 | .0159 | 1.00 |
| Violent crimes[c] | 23.98 | 38.624 | 1 | 468 |
| Property crimes[c] | 114.01 | 152.680 | 6 | 1799 |
| Drugs and vice crimes[c] | 25.26 | 106.845 | 1 | 1578 |
| Disorder incidents[c] | 132.98 | 296.416 | 5 | 4762 |
| Suspicious incidents[c] | 117.40 | 172.428 | 10 | 2072 |

[a] Excluding traffic incidents.
[b] Factors have a mean of 0 and SD=1 and the variables that loaded most highly for each factor are listed below each factor.
[c] As derived from the initial calls for service database, given that this is the starting point of each decision pathway.

# IV. RESULTS

## OVERALL DECISION PATHWAY SCORES

The first set of analyses in Table 12 displays the regression of the total pathway score average within block groups upon crime, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic conditions. The purpose for displaying the three alternate models in Table 12 is to emphasize how greater model specification—especially with racial categories, but also with crime—can lead to different findings. In all three models, the socioeconomic components representing disorganization, needs and wealth, as derived by the principal component analysis, are included.

**Table 12. Multivariate regression models of spatially lagged full decision pathway scores**

| | Model (1)<br>No specific racial group specified | Model (2)<br>Racial groups specified | Model (3)<br>Racial groups specified and violence included |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 1.205***<br>(.016) | 1.216***<br>(.015) | 1.167***<br>(.021) |
| Calls for Service per 100 people | -5.32E-005<br>(.000) | -1.41E-006<br>(.000) | |
| DISORG Component | .021**<br>(.008) | .022**<br>(.007) | .020**<br>(.007) |
| NEEDS Component | .010<br>(.010) | .026**<br>(.010) | .019+<br>(.010) |
| WEALTH Component | -.084***<br>(.008) | -.087***<br>(.008) | -.079***<br>(.009) |
| % Non-white | -.037<br>(.046) | | |
| % Black | | -.466***<br>(.073) | -.494***<br>(.073) |
| % Asian | | .207**<br>(.059) | .170<br>(.004) |
| % Hispanic | | -.234<br>(.141) | -.231<br>(.139) |
| Proportion of calls indicating violence | | | 1.149**<br>(.355) |
| R squared<br>Standard error of estimate<br>Number of Observations | .196<br>(.169)<br>566 | .271<br>(.161)<br>566 | .285<br>(.160)<br>560 |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p=.062. Estimates shown are unstandardized B coefficients, with standard errors of those estimates in parentheses.

In Model (1) of Table 12, the general racial distinction “non-White” is used. Here, describing race in this way does not lead to race being a statistically significant predictor in explaining differences across pathway average scores in block groups. Further, while the call rate does not affect upgrading or downgrading, it does appears that in places that evidence *increased* wealth and *less* disorganization, there is a tendency for officers to downgrade calls for service (e.g., dismiss calls, not write reports or make arrests, or reduce the seriousness of crimes).

However, "non-White" is an amorphous classification that does not reflect the diversity of the location or interest of this study. This city has substantial Asian, Black, and Hispanic populations, and it may be that police treat various minority communities differently, leading to a nullifying or watering down of effects when groups are analyzed together. Compare Model (1) to Model (2), when race and ethnicity of these places are more specified. Increased socioeconomic advantage remains a significant finding – as places become less disadvantaged, police tend to show downgrading tendencies in these areas. But here, more specific findings with regard to racial composition emerge. The greater the proportion of Black residents in a block group, the more likely police will also downgrade (or at least upgrade less) compared to other places. For places with greater proportion of Asian residents, the effect is the opposite; police tend to show upgrading tendencies in these places, or increasing the initial seriousness of the call, or taking investigations one step further.

Studies have also indicated that the levels of violence in the area, not just the level of crime, may increase police officer use of force (Terrill & Reisig, 2003) or decrease general police service (Smith, 1986), thereby mediating the effects of neighborhood racial characteristics. Model (3) includes a measure of the proportion of crime reported in the block group that indicates violence occurred. The calls for service rate was removed to avoid multicollinearity, as the call rate was highly correlated to the proportion of calls that indicated violence had occurred. Notice, the fit of the model (3) improves slightly over Model (2), and the finding is strong: Greater levels of violence means more evidence of higher total pathway scores. This is not surprising, given that violent crimes usually result in at least a report being written and sometimes in an arrest. Writing reports and making arrests are heavily weighted actions in the scoring scheme used here, which contributes to this significant finding and its relative impact. However, even when including violent crime rates, the relationship between scores, % Black, and the socioeconomic attributes of places continues to remain significant (although the magnitudes of the effects of the socioeconomic variables decline). This first set of analysis indicates not only that it is important to include other races and ethnicities in places that do show a substantial mix of groups, but also that even with the inclusion of an expectedly powerful variable (violence), the effects of race continues to be salient.

But studies have also indicated interactive and moderating effects between neighborhood racial composition, socioeconomic characteristics, and policing outcomes (Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Weitzer, 1999; Wu et al., 2009). Indeed, there is at least a public perception that violence and racial composition of a place are correlated. Although Lum (under review) has found evidence that racial composition is not significantly related to spatial densities of violence and drug offenses in Seattle, this public perception is undoubtedly strong. To test for this possibility, two interaction terms were added to Model (3) and shown in Model (4) in Table 13 – an interaction between the proportion of the block group population that was Black and the proportion that was living in poverty, as well as between % Black and the violent crime rate. The results in Table 13 indicate not only the non-significance of these interaction terms, but that their inclusion does not affect the significance of the main effects of % Black. The effect of violence becomes weaker, however. There was an effect of the socioeconomic factors in this model, however; only the WEALTH factor emerged as significant.

**Table 13. Full model including interaction terms using spatially lagged total mean pathway scores**

| | Model (4)<br>Complete model with interaction terms |
|---|---|
| Constant | 1.183***<br>(.023) |
| DISORG Component | .018$^{+}$<br>(.009) |
| NEEDS Component | .015<br>(.011) |
| WEALTH Component | -.081***<br>(.009) |
| % Black | -.744***<br>(.184) |
| % Asian | -.175<br>(.060) |
| % Hispanic | -.228<br>(.139) |
| Violence proportion | .773$^{++}$<br>(.733) |
| % Black x DISORG | .022<br>(.069) |
| % Black x Proportion of calls indicating violence | 4.300<br>(2.77) |
| R squared<br>Standard error of estimate<br>Number of Observations | .289<br>(.160)<br>560 |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, $^{+}$p=.052, $^{++}$p=.070. Estimates shown are unstandardized B coefficients, with standard errors of those estimates in parentheses.

It might be the case, as the second research question above suggests, that overall scores are affected by the percentage of foreign-born individuals or linguistically isolated groups. Perceived communication difficulties between these groups and police, as well as either real or stereotypically believed cultural barriers, may lead to systematically different outcomes in places officers perceive as dominated by these special ethnic sub-groups. As the correlation matrix in Appendix A indicates, the percentage of foreign-born and linguistically isolated residents within block groups is highly variable in this jurisdiction (from 0% to 62%) but also highly correlated to the percentage of Asian and Hispanic. Because of their high correlation, they are analyzed excluding the % Asian and Hispanic variables. The results in Table 14 indicate that places with greater populations of foreign-born individuals (Model 5) or more linguistically isolated households (Model 6) do not differ significantly from their counterparts in terms of the overall decision pathway scores. However, what continues to remain a consistent finding in both of these models is that police downgrade in places with more wealth and less social disorganization and with greater proportion of Black residents.

**Table 14. Foreign-born and linguistically isolated communities and spatially lagged pathway scores**

| | Model (5) Including foreign-born in the model | Model (6) Including linguistically isolated in the model |
|---|---|---|
| Constant | 1.149*** (.021) | 1.160*** (.019) |
| DISORG Component | .017* (.007) | .015* (.007) |
| NEEDS Component | .016 (.010) | .017 (.010) |
| WEALTH Component | -.074*** (.008) | -.077*** (.008) |
| % Black | -.493*** (.074) | -.495*** (.074) |
| Proportion of calls indicating violence | 1.255*** (.355) | 1.280*** (.355) |
| % Foreign born | .140$^{+}$ (.073) | |
| Linguistically isolated household | | .178 (.121) |
| R squared | .274 | .272 |
| Standard error of estimate | (.161) | (.161) |
| Number of Observations | 560 | 560 |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, $^{+}$p=.056. Estimates shown are unstandardized B coefficients, with standard errors of those estimates in parentheses.

SPECIFIC SCORES AT DECISION POINTS

The first set of results shown above in Models 1 through 6 examine the overall tendency of the decision pathway using the average of the total pathway scores in a block group. However, the vast majority of incidents that the police handle never result in an arrest. To see the predictive effects of the model for each stage of the decision pathway, Table 15 displays four regressions. Model (7) regresses the spatially lagged averages of the first decision point of the initially dispatched call and the officer modification independent variables on place characteristics. Model (8) regresses the decision to write the report and for what type of incident. Model (10) uses the dependent variable of the score from the report to the arrest stage. Additionally, given that arrest is so rare, Model (9) examines whether factors predict the spatially lagged pathway score up to the report but not including arrest.

**Table 15. Multivariate regression models of spatially lagged decision scores within the pathway**

| | Model (7) From initial call to officer response | Model (8) From officer response to report | Model (9) From initial call to report stage | Model (10) From report to arrest stage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | -.195*** (.004) | 1.256*** (.018) | 1.061 *** (.019) | .106*** (.006) |
| DISORG Component | -.003 (.001) | .005 (.006) | .002 (.006) | .018*** (.002) |
| NEEDS Component | .000 (.002) | .017$^{+}$ (.014) | .017$^{++}$ (.009) | .002 (.003) |
| WEALTH Component | -.004* (.002) | -.061*** (.007) | -.064*** (.008) | -.014*** (.003) |
| % Black | -.007 (.015) | -.577*** (.064) | -.583*** (.066) | -.090 (.026) |
| % Asian | .077*** (.012) | -.024 (.051) | .053 (.054) | .116*** (.018) |
| % Hispanic | .002 (.028) | -.352** (.120) | -.349** (.125) | .118 (.043) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proportion of calls indicating violence | .005*** (.073) | .855** (.307) | .860** (.320) | .289** (.109) |
| R squared | .135 | .235 | .243 | .434 |
| Standard error of the estimate | (.033) | (.139) | (.144) | (.049) |
| Number of Observations | 560 | 560 | 560 | 560 |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, $^{+}$p=.054, $^{++}$p=.058. Estimates shown are unstandardized B coefficients, with standard errors of those estimates in parentheses.

When examining predictors of the initial decision to change the nature of the call upon first arrival, an interesting finding emerges. First, the proportion of crime that is violent continues to be a salient factor in explaining upgrading at all individual decision points. However, for different decision points, there is variation in what influences spatially lagged scores. At the early stage of the decision pathway, where most officer responses to incidents are completed, the magnitude of the effect of violence at places is much weaker. This most likely points to the effect of violence on pathway scores and its disproportionate effect on the decision of police to write reports or arrest suspects. Further, during this initial encounter, the proportion of Black or Hispanic residents do not emerge as significant co-variates as they did when predicting the total pathway score (and the wealth of an area is a weak predictor). The downgrading connected to wealthy places and places with larger Black populations seems to be occurring at the more formal and official stages of report writing.

For Asians and Hispanics, the effects seem to vary across the pathway. During the report writing stage, a downgrading occurs in Hispanic communities, only to see the opposite effect (upgrading) during the arrest stage. In other words, less reports are written and for less serious crimes in Hispanic communities, but when an arrest is made, the arrest may be for a more serious charge. Asian communities see an upgrading effect at the first response of the officer, and also at the arrest stage, but findings are not significant at the report writing stage. In other words, at places that have great percentage of Asian residents, police are getting to the scene and telling the dispatcher that the incident is more serious than what was initially called in. When making an arrest, the arrest may be for a more serious charge than what was indicated in the report. Again, one should be careful about the interpretation of this finding, as with the findings regarding % Black or higher wealth without qualitative follow-up. We do not know the motivation of the officers at these locations. It could be that among the Asian community there is systematically an initial tendency to report incidents as less serious, or there might be differences in communication styles that leads to the initial misinterpretation. It may also be the case that police feel places with more Asians deserve more upgrading. But these are only guesses, based not on science but on stereotypes; we need further empirical and qualitative analysis to better understand motivations. The only conclusion that can be drawn here is that there is a significant difference in police service, which occurs as block groups have greater proportions of Asian residents.

However, when moving across the table through the decision pathway from the modified call for service to report (Model 8), the impact of the % Asian variable declines and flips signs, suggesting a significant downgrading at this stage of the pathway. The % Black and % Hispanic variables emerge as significant in the negative direction as well. Here, at the report writing stage, places that have an increase in any minority population will also experience a significant downgrading effect (i.e., less report writing with the possibility of also reduction in the seriousness of crime classifications). At this stage, the WEALTH factor is the only socioeconomic variable that remains significant, also indicating downgrading in more wealthy areas.

When examining the cumulative score of the initial response through the reporting stage (Model 9), our initial findings begin to reemerge—with Wealth, % Black, % Hispanic, and violence significantly predicting tendencies to downgrade, although the effect of the Asian variable disappears. The fact that % Hispanic doesn't seem to predict the entire spatially lagged mean score across the entire pathway is likely explained by the washing out effect of downgrading in the report stage, but upgrading in the arrest stage.

Finally, Model (10) examines the impact of these block group characteristics on only the decision to arrest (and for what charge) once a report has been written, disregarding earlier upgrading and downgrading. At this decision stage, the % Black is no longer relevant in upgrading or downgrading, although wealthier communities enjoy either less arrest or charges that are less severe than what was indicated in the report. In Asian and Hispanic communities, arrest is more likely, or the charges given are higher than what is indicated in the written reports. Thus, the overall downgrading effect for places with more Black residents seems concentrated at the official report writing stage, not at the arrest stage. This downgrading effect at the rport stage is seen to a lesser extent with the Hispanic community and not at all in the Asian communities. And, at the arrest stage, the greater wealth and less disorganization leads also to a significant downgrading effect as well.

## DID SEPTEMBER 11th MATTER?

Since the decision pathways analyzed here occur in 2001, I include a special analysis of the effects of September 11th on the distribution of these decision pathways. One might hypothesize that September 11th could affect how society and law enforcement perceive minority communities, especially those who are (or appear) foreign born or linguistically isolated. Table 16 shows some descriptive statistics before and after September 11th in terms of the means and standard deviations of activities within Seattle's 568 block groups. Notice that the average rate of calls per 100 people dropped significantly after September 11th. However, the proportion of reports and arrests remained the same, at approximately 31% for reports and 4% for arrests. Further, the effects of September 11th did not seem to have, overall, significantly affected the average pathway score in block groups.

**Table 16. Descriptive statistics for block groups before and after September 11th (N=568)**

| | Before 9/11 | After 9/11 |
|---|---|---|
| Total calls in BG | **329** *(584.3)* | **142** *(240.8)* |
| Rate of calls per 100 people | **34** *(58.4)* | **15** *(24.4)* |
| Proportion of reports written | **.31** *(.06)* | **.32** *(.08)* |
| Proportion of arrests made | **.04** *(.03)* | **.04** *(.03)* |
| Mean of total pathway score | **1.18** *(.328)* | **1.21** *(.410)* |

Standard deviations in parentheses.

However, the question of interest is whether September 11th had a negative effect on places with higher proportions of racial and ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the proportion of block groups of Arab descent, which would be the most relevant ethnicity to examine in terms of differential effects from September 11th, given the identity of the hijackers. However, we can look at the different racial and ethnic categories that we have as well as at the foreign-born variable. Interestingly, as Table 17 shows, when comparing models before and after September 11th the only racial group that continues to predict significantly different pathway scores is Black. Also of note is the influence that Asian and foreign born communities had on decision making before and after September 11th. While being in an Asian or foreign born community would increase the likelihood of an officer upgrading a call for service (either to a more serious crime, or exerting more formal social control through reporting writing or arrest), this effect does not remain salient after September 11th.